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Unwanted memories of traumatic events are a core symptom of post-traumatic stress disorder. A range
of interventions including imaginal exposure and elaboration of the trauma memory in its autobio-
graphical context are effective in reducing such unwanted memories. This study explored whether
priming for stimuli that occur in the context of trauma and evaluative conditioning may play a role in the
therapeutic effects of these procedures. Healthy volunteers (N¼ 122) watched analogue traumatic and
neutral picture stories. They were then randomly allocated to 20 min of either imaginal exposure,
autobiographical memory elaboration, or a control condition designed to prevent further processing of
the picture stories. A blurred picture identiﬁcation task showed that neutral objects that preceded
traumatic pictures in the stories were subsequently more readily identiﬁed than those that had preceded
neutral stories, indicating enhanced priming. There was also an evaluative conditioning effect in that
participants disliked neutral objects that had preceded traumatic pictures more. Autobiographical
memory elaboration reduced the enhanced priming effect. Both interventions reduced the evaluative
conditioning effect. Imaginal exposure and autobiographical memory elaboration both reduced the
frequency of subsequent unwanted memories of the picture stories.
 2010 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Unwanted distressing trauma memories are a core symptom of
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD, American Psychiatric
Association, 1994). A range of therapeutic interventions are effec-
tive in reducing such unwanted memories (for reviews see Bradley,
Greene, Russ, Dutra, & Westen, 2005; Bisson et al., 2007). These
include imaginal reliving of the trauma (Foa & Rothbaum,1998) and
cognitive interventions designed to increase the elaboration of the
traumatic experience in terms of linking it with its context of other
autobiographical information (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). This raises the
question of what memory processes are involved in unwanted
memories of trauma and their successful treatment.
This study focuses on two memory processes that may be
involved in the triggering of unwanted trauma memories: percep-
tual priming and evaluative conditioning. Interest in perceptual
priming was generated by clinical observations suggesting that
a particularly wide range of stimuli can trigger unwanted trauma
memories (e.g., Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Foa, Steketee, &
Rothbaum, 1989). Interview and questionnaire studies suggestedx: þ44 20 7848 0591.
Y license.that triggers are oftenperceptually similar to the intrusive contentor
to stimuli that signalled theonsetof thesemoments fromthe trauma
(Ehlers, Hackmann, & Michael, 2004; Ehlers et al., 2002; Michael,
Ehlers, Halligan, & Clark, 2005; Southwick et al., 1993). For
example, a patient with PTSD kept seeing headlights coming
towards him, just like he had seen them shortly before his head-on
car crash. Observations in therapy suggested that these intrusions
wereoften triggeredby roundpatchesof lightonadark surface, (e.g.,
a patch of sunlight on a lawn,white spots on a dark cloth). Ehlers and
Clark (2000) suggested that the easy triggering of reexperiencing in
PTSD by perceptually similar cues is in part a function of strong
perceptual priming for stimuli that occurred shortly before and
during the traumatic event.
Some studies have tested the hypothesis that stimuli that are
associatedwith the trauma aremore strongly primed inpeoplewith
PTSD than in those without PTSD. Participants encoded trauma-
related and control stimuli (mainlywords or sentences) andpriming
was tested later with word-stem completion or perceptual identi-
ﬁcation tasks. The results mostly support the hypothesis of greater
perceptual priming for material associated with the trauma in
people with PTSD compared those without PTSD (Amir, Leiner, &
Bomyea, 2010; Amir, McNally, & Wiegartz, 1996; Ehring & Ehlers,
in press; McNally & Amir, 1996; Michael, Ehlers, & Halligan, 2005,
but see McNally & Amir, 1996 for negative results). Priming for
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(Ehring&Ehlers, inpress;Michael, Ehlers,&Halligan, 2005;Michael,
Ehlers, Halligan, & Clark, 2005). These experiments investigated
post-trauma priming and thus supported a role of priming in the
maintenance of intrusive memories and generalization of triggers,
but they did not investigate perceptual priming during the trauma.
Experimental analoguestudiesprovided initial support for the role
of perceptual priming in the development of analogue intrusive
traumamemories in healthy controls (Arntz, de Groot, & Kindt, 2005;
Ehlers, Michael, Chen, Payne, & Shan, 2006; Michael & Ehlers, 2007).
Forexample, Ehlers et al. (2006)developedanexperimentalparadigm
to studyvisual perceptual priming for stimuli thatoccur ina traumatic
context. The paradigm investigates priming for neutral objects that
occur just before something “traumatic” happens. Participants watch
a series of “traumatic” and neutral picture stories. The content of the
ﬁrst picture is unemotional. It contains neutral preceding stimuli (e.g.
a cushion) for which memory is later tested. During the second
picture, either something “traumatic” (e.g., amanbeing attackedwith
a knife) or something neutral happens. The last picture focuses on the
outcome of the story for themain character (e.g., the attacked man is
being decapitated). In accordance with the enhanced perceptual
priminghypothesis, the results showed thatneutral stimuli preceding
a “traumatic” event showed enhanced perceptual priming and pre-
dicted intrusive memories (Ehlers et al., 2006).
Michael and Ehlers (2007) replicated these results with
a somewhat modiﬁed set of picture stories and further showed that
a post-“trauma” experimental manipulation designed to promote
autobiographical elaboration of the memory for the picture stories
reduced the enhanced perceptual priming effect and the relative
probability of subsequent reexperiencing symptoms. This inter-
vention was modeled on procedures used in Cognitive Therapy for
PTSD (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Ehlers et al., 2003; Ehlers, Clark,
Hackmann, McManus, & Fennell, 2005) that involve accessing the
most traumatic moments from the trauma and their meanings, and
then explicitly linking them with other information from the
patient’s experience (or from cognitive restructuring) that give
these moments a less threatening meaning.
Other memory processes of interest in the triggering of
unwanted trauma memories are learned associations (e.g., Ehlers &
Clark, 2000; Foa et al., 1989; Keane, Zimering, & Caddell, 1985). It
has been suggested that during trauma fear responses become
associated with stimuli that are present at the time, and subse-
quently generalize more broadly to stimuli and situations that
resemble the original trauma (Pavlovian conditioning, e.g. Foa et al.,
1989; Keane et al., 1985). Several studies demonstrated that trauma
survivors with PTSD show heightened physiological reactivity to
trauma reminders compared to traumatized and non-traumatized
controls (see Pole, 2007, for a review). In addition, learned SeS
associations may play a role (Ehlers & Clark, 2000). More generally,
there is a large literature on evaluative conditioning (for reviews
see De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001; Hofmann, De Houwer,
Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). Evaluative conditioning
refers to a change in the valence of a stimulus that is due to the
pairing of that stimulus with another positive or negative stimulus.
Evaluative conditioning has been shown with explicit measures of
valence (e.g. ratings of howmuch the individual likes the stimulus)
as well as implicit measures (e.g. startle responses) (Hofmann et al.,
2010). Neutral stimuli that people perceive in the context of trauma
may thus acquire negative valence via evaluative conditioning and
may therefore become triggers of negative affect and unwanted
trauma memories in its aftermath. Interestingly, the literature also
shows that evaluative conditioning is modiﬁable by subsequent
intervention such as extinction training (Hofmann et al., 2010).
The present experimental analogue study used Michael and
Ehlers’s (2007) paradigm to test whether priming for stimuli thatoccur in the context of trauma and evaluative conditioning may
play a role in the therapeutic effects of imaginal exposure and
autobiographical memory elaboration on subsequent unwanted
traumamemories. The present experiment examined the following
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 (Enhanced perceptual priming): On the basis of
studies by Ehlers et al. (2006) andMichael and Ehlers (2007), it was
expected that neutral stimuli that immediately precede a “trau-
matic” picture will be more strongly primed than neutral stimuli
that precede a neutral picture.
Hypothesis 2 (Effects of elaboration on enhanced priming): On the
basis Michael and Ehlers’s (2007) ﬁndings, it was expected that
post-trauma autobiographical memory elaboration, but not imag-
inal exposure or control tasks designed to prevent processing of the
traumatic material, will reduce the enhanced priming effect.
Hypothesis 3 (Evaluative conditioning). On the basis of studies on
evaluative conditioning (De Houwer et al., 2001; Hofmann et al.,
2010), it was expected that participants will dislike neutral
stimuli that immediately precede “traumatic” pictures to a greater
extent than neutral stimuli that precede neutral pictures.
Hypothesis 4 (Intervention effects on evaluative conditioning). On
the basis of research showing that evaluative conditioning can be
modiﬁed by subsequent intervention (Hofmann et al., 2010), it was
expected that the evaluative conditioning effect will be reduced by
both post-trauma imaginal exposure and autobiographical memory
elaboration.
Hypothesis 5 (Intervention effects on reexperiencing): On the basis
of the efﬁcacy of prolonged exposure (Foa et al., 1999, 2005) and
cognitive therapy (Ehlers et al., 2003, 2005) in the treatment of
PTSD, we expected that both post-trauma imaginal exposure and
autobiographical memory elaboration will lead to a reduction in
reexperiencing symptoms following the experiment.
2. Method
2.1. Overview
Volunteers watched the analogue “traumatic” and neutral
picture stories developed by Michael and Ehlers (2007). They were
then randomly allocated to 20 min of either imaginal exposure,
memory elaboration, or a control condition designed to prevent
processing of the picture stories. A blurred picture task then tested
perceptual priming and conditioned emotional evaluations for
objects from the stories. To test the possible inﬂuence of explicit
memory on the pattern of ﬁndings, participants also did a recog-
nition test. Intrusive memories were assessed by telephone inter-
view 4 weeks and 3 months later.
2.2. Participants
Participants were 122 volunteers who were recruited by
advertisements in the local area in south London and via emails to
staff and students of King’s College London. They were reimbursed
with £15 for their time and travel expenses. Volunteers were
excluded if they reported a history of trauma, current blood/injury
phobia or severe depression. Table 1 shows participant character-
istics. The experimental groups did not differ in sex, c2 (2, 122)¼
0.34, p¼ 0.844, age, F (1, 120)¼ 0.98, p¼ 0.378, trait anxiety, F (1,
121)¼ 1.50, p¼ 0.228 or state anxiety, F (1, 121)¼ 1.72, p¼ 0.182.
3. Picture stories
The experimental software for all parts of the experiment was
programmedwith SuperLab. Picture stories andmemory tests were
presented on a 15’’ screen of an Apple Macintosh computer. The
Table 1
Sample characteristics and control variables.
Control group Imaginal exposure group Memory elaboration group
Sex male (n, %)
female (n, %)
20 (49%)
21 (51%)
18 (44%)
23 (56%)
20 (50%)
20 (50%)
Age M (SD) 32.38 (10.87) 30.80 (11.45) 29.13 (8.56)
STAI e state anxiety M (SD) 30.73 (6.93) 32.19 (7.98) 29.23 (6.60)
STAI e trait anxiety M (SD) 38.93 (9.37) 35.61 (7.95) 37.05 (8.73)
Negative mood M (SD)
before picture stories 13.25 (7.41) 14.15 (9.06) 13.38 (8.69)
after neutral stories 17.47 (12.29) 18.17 (13.65) 14.84 (8.27)
after trauma stories 27.63 (18.18) 23.90 (16.84) 22.31 (12.12)
after experimental
manipulation
12.59 (9.47) 20.67 (13.16) 16.78 (12.33)
Recognition test
Discrimination sensitivity d’
central objects/trauma stories 2.38 (1.81) 3.01 (1.85) 2.42 (1.68)
central objects/neutral stories 2.91 (1.69) 2.95 (1.87) 3.24 (1.68)
preceding objects/trauma stories 1.10 (1.06) 1.48 (1.44) 1.12 (1.26)
preceding objects/neutral stories 1.06 (1.10) 1.09 (0.93) 1.01 (1.36)
Response criterion
central objects/trauma stories 0.02 (0.84) 0.34 (0.94) 0.27 (0.75)
central objects/neutral stories 0.52 (1.04) 0.55 (0.96) 0.46 (0.94)
preceding objects/trauma stories 0.38 (0.56) 0.34 (0.94) 0.39 (0.56)
preceding objects/neutral stories 0.42 (0.65) 0.34 (0.66) 0.63 (0.55)
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Participants saw eight analogue “traumatic” and eight neutral
picture stories, each consisting of three pictures. One additional
neutral story (of a man getting drunk) was used to familiarize the
participants with the task. The ﬁrst picture (presented for 20 s)
introduced the main character. It was always neutral so that it was
not possible to conclude from this picture whether the story was
unpleasant or neutral. The ﬁrst picture contained two neutral
objects in the background that were unimportant for the course of
the story (preceding objects). The second picture (presented for
20 s) depicted the plot of the story and showed something trau-
matic or neutral happening. It contained one central object that was
important for the course of the story, and determined whether the
content was traumatic or neutral. The third and last picture (pre-
sented for 15 s) showed the ﬁnal outcome for the main character of
the story. It focused on and underlined the traumatic versus neutral
content of the story. The unpleasant and neutral picture stories
were matched for the number of males, females, and objects
occurring in them, and whether the event happened indoors or
outdoors. For example, one unpleasant story contained a dog killing
a man and the matching story depicted a cat stealing a sandwich
from its owner. A list of the content of all stories is presented in
the Appendix. Table 2 illustrates the structure of one unpleasant
(a man being stabbed and decapitated) and one neutral picture
story (a man coming home and seeing his wife repairing a boot on
the dining table), and lists what objects occur in these stories.
Participants were told that it was the purpose of the experiment
to test how pictures affect people’s emotions. They were asked to
watch the pictures closely and to imagine that they were present at
the scene. After each picture story, they were asked to rate theTable 2
Story structure, example of one “traumatic” and one parallel neutral story. The objects fo
“Traumatic” story
PICTURE 1:
Main character in neutral setting
A man watching TV
preceding stimuli (blurred picture and recognition tests) bottle, cushion
PICTURE 2:
Main character experiences “traumatic” or neutral event
The man is attacke
central stimuli (recognition test only) knife
PICTURE 3:
“Traumatic” versus neutral outcome
Decapitated manpictures for pleasantness and arousal. There was no indication that
memory for the pictures would be tested later.
Picture stories were presented in two blocks of “traumatic” and
neutral stories, in counterbalanced order. Blockwise presentation
was chosen to prevent crossover of negative emotions produced by
unpleasant picture stories to neutral ones. Order of presentation
did not inﬂuence the results. Between blocks participants had
a 5-min break. The order of the stories within each block was
randomized and different for every participant.
3.1. Experimental manipulation
Participants were randomly allocated to one of three experi-
mental conditions that followed the picture story task.
3.1.1. Exposure group
Instructions were modeled on imaginal exposure (Foa &
Rothbaum, 1998). Participants were asked to close their eyes and
to visualize the picture stories in their mind’s eye as vividly as they
could. Theywere encouraged to visualize as much detail as possible
and recall their own feelings and thoughts while holding the
images in their mind. They were asked to go through the picture
stories in the order they had seen them and to slow down when
they came to the ones that they foundmost disturbing, making sure
that they visualized all the details and recalled their feelings and
thoughts at the time. The condition lasted 20 min. As a manipula-
tion check, participants were asked every 5 min (via a tape
recording) to write downwhat they had visualized and to rate how
vivid the imaginal exposure had been, on a scale from0 ‘not at all’ to
10 ‘very much’. The content of the notes indicated that participantsr which perceptual priming and recognition memory were later tested are in italics.
Neutral story
A man entering the kitchen
spatula, frying pan
d with a knife by an intruder The man notices that his wife is repairing
an old boot on the kitchen table
boot
Puzzled man
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M¼ 7.20, SD¼ 1.75.
3.1.2. Autobiographical memory elaboration group
This group received the same instructions as in Michael and
Ehlers (2007). Participants were asked to answer ﬁve questions in
writing, which were designed to facilitate autobiographical
memory elaboration. The participants received a sheet of paper
with the ﬁve questions, as well as oral instructions. The ﬁrst
question asked what the participants had done before they came to
the experiment and how they had felt. The second question was
whether the experiment had matched the participant’s expecta-
tions. In the third and fourth questions the participants were asked
to think back to the stories and to indicate which ones they liked/
disliked most, and whether the stories reminded them of things
that had happened in their own lives. The ﬁnal question asked
about any plans that participants had for the rest of the day and
how they felt about them. The experimenter reassured the partic-
ipants that their answers would be treated with the strictest
conﬁdentiality. The participants had 20 min to answer the ques-
tions, and were instructed to spend the same amount of time on
each of the questions. When the time for one question was up,
participants were told to move on to the next question. The content
of the notes indicated that participants had followed the
instructions.
3.1.3. Control group
Participants in the control group were told that the experiment
dealt not only with the processing of pictures but also with the
processing of words. They were given several sheets that each
contained a different word task, and were told that they should try
to complete as many of these tasks as possible in the next 20 min.
The ﬁrst task contained a list of neutral words and participants had
to explain the meaning of these words (e.g. ‘connect’ means ‘join
together’). The second task contained phrases, and participants had
to identify words that were not correctly spelled given the context
of the phrase (‘a honey be’). The third task was to identify which
word of a group of four was misspelled (investigation, readilly,
examined, assuming). The fourth task comprised groups of words,
and participants had to ﬁnd the word that was closest in meaning
to a word typed above the group (malaria: basement, fever, theatre,
fruit, ocean, tune). No task contained trauma-related words.
3.2. Memory measures
Perceptual priming for objects shown in the picture stories was
tested with a blurred object identiﬁcation task. To check for
possible inﬂuences of explicit memory on the pattern of results,
participants also completed a recognition test. In designing the
memory tests, objects from the picture stories were isolated and
edited using Adobe PhotoShop. All objects were left in their original
size. As each participant completed both memory tests, two
equivalent sets (set 1, set 2) of objects were created for each task.
Each set contained one of the preceding objects from each story
and, in the recognition task, half of the central objects from
unpleasant and neutral scenes. Half of the participants saw objects
from set 1 in the perceptual priming task and objects from set 2 in
the recognition task. For the other half of the participants, sets were
reversed. Picture set did not inﬂuence the results.
3.2.1. Perceptual priming task
A blurred object identiﬁcation task assessed priming as visual
perceptual priming leads to an enhanced identiﬁcation rate for
previously seen objects. In order to decrease the chance that
participants noticed that the task was a memory test, only thepreceding objects from the stories (8 from “traumatic” and 8 from
neutral stories) were included. Furthermore, the majority of items
(n¼ 24) were unprimed objects that had not featured in the picture
stories (e.g., a hole punch, scissors). These unprimed objects were
matched for size to the primed objects from the picture stories.
Participants were told that they were now doing a different task
that was unrelated to the picture stories. They were informed that
the task was about how easy it is for people to identify blurred
pictures. Theywere instructed to look at thepictures and guesswhat
theobjectmight be,working as quickly and as accuratelyas possible.
The experimenter wrote down the answers, whichwere later coded
for accuracy. If participants could not guess what the object might
be, they indicated that they did not know. After their answer,
participants moved on to the next object by pressing the space bar.
The preceding objects from the picture stories were blurred
with a Gaussian ﬁlter to a degree which allowed approximately 50%
correct identiﬁcation in pilot participants with no prior exposure to
the picture stories. The preceding objects shown in the “traumatic”
and neutral stories did not differ in baseline identiﬁcation rates
(objects from unpleasant stories: M¼ 51.3%, objects from neutral
stories: M¼ 49.8%, N¼ 40 pilot participants, Michael & Ehlers,
2007). The unprimed items were blurred slightly less so that their
baseline identiﬁcation rate wasM¼ 59.7%. This was done to ensure
that each participant would identify at least a few unprimed
objects, thus reducing the chance that participants would notice
that the task tests performance for stimuli from picture stories.
Michael and Ehlers (2007) presented a series of pilot studies
showing that there were no differences in priming, recognition
memory or emotional evaluations when the objects were pre-
sented without their emotional context. Thus, possible memory
differences in the present experiment can be interpreted as due to
the emotional character of the stories.
The objects were presented on the computer screen in succes-
sive, random order that varied with each participant.
As the baseline identiﬁcation rates for the individual objects
varied substantially, we calculated the incremental identiﬁcation
probability for each object compared to its baseline identiﬁcation
rate. This method allowed us to obtain for each object a precise
measure of how much its identiﬁcation rate was increased through
prior exposure. If the baseline identiﬁcation rate for an object were,
for example, 0.4, then the incremental identiﬁcation rate would be
0.6 in the case of correct identiﬁcation and 0.4 in the case of non-
identiﬁcation. For objects from picture stories, perceptual priming
from prior exposure would show in positive incremental identiﬁ-
cation probability, whereas unprimed objects (no prior exposure)
should be identiﬁed at baseline rates, resulting in a mean incre-
mental identiﬁcation probability of 0.
3.2.2. Evaluative conditioning
To assess evaluative conditioning, participants rated how much
they liked each picture of the blurred picture task on a scale from
0 ‘not at all’ to 100 ‘very much’, with 50 representing ‘neutral.’
Michael and Ehlers (2007) had shown that participants who had
only seen the ﬁrst picture of the picture stories rated the objects as
neutral (objects from trauma stories:M¼ 45.20, SD¼ 12.77, objects
from neutral stories, M¼ 44.56, SD¼ 12.32; distractor objects,
M¼ 44.37, SD¼ 11.23).
3.2.3. Recognition task
The recognition task tested explicit memory performance for
objects from the picture stories. It included both central and
preceding objects from the picture stories. For each “old” object
from the picture stories, a parallel new object was chosen that
looked somewhat different in appearance. These parallel new
objects matched the objects from the picture stories in size and
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another watch of approximately the same size was used as the
parallel object). Objects were presented on a computer screen in
successive, random order which was different for each participant.
Participants were asked to indicate whether or not they had seen
the object previously in the stories by pressing the corresponding
keys on the computer keyboard.
3.3. Self-report questionnaires
The Past Experience Questionnaire screens participants for
a trauma history, blood/injury phobia, and severe depression.
Participants who met any of these criteria were excluded from the
study. Participants also completed the state and trait versions of the
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg,
& Jacobs, 1983) and a 4-item Mood Questionnaire comprising 4
Likert scales assessing current mood (happy, anxious, depressed,
angry), each on a scale from0 ‘not at all’ to 100 ‘extremely.’ The total
score (with happy ratings reversed) was used for data analysis.
3.4. Intrusive memories interview
At 4 weeks and 3 months, participants were interviewed on the
telephone. They were asked about any unwanted memories of the
picture stories that had occurred without an apparent reason. They
rated the frequency of suchmemories in the past 2 weeks on a scale
from 0 ‘never’ to 7 ‘more often than once a day’.
3.5. Procedure
The study was approved by the local Ethics Committee. Partic-
ipants received an information sheet about the study and were
given further information on the telephone when arranging the
appointment. They were informed in writing and by the experi-
menter that the study involved watching some unpleasant pictures
and that they could withdraw at any time without having to give
a reason. On arrival at the laboratory, participants gave written
consent. They then completed the Past Experience Questionnaire,
the STAI (state version) and the ﬁrst Mood Rating. Participants were
then given oral and written instructions for watching the picture
stories, and watched the two blocks of picture stories. They
completed a Mood Rating after each of the blocks. The experi-
mental manipulation (20 min) followed. Participants completed
another Mood Rating and then had a 10-min break, during which
the experimenter served a drink and conversed with them about
unrelated matters. They then completed the perceptual priming
task and the emotional evaluation ratings, followed by completion
of the STAI (trait version) and the object recognition task.
The experimenter made sure that participants felt well before
leaving and gave participants her contact details, encouraging them
to get in touch if they felt in any way distressed about the experi-
ment. However, none of the participants took up this offer and none
reported that they found the experiment too distressing.
Participants completed the Intrusive Memories Interview over
the telephone at 4 weeks and 3 months after the experiment. At 3
months they were debriefed about the purposes of the study.
3.6. Data analysis
3.6.1. Perceptual priming task
The priming index was computed to compare priming for
objects from “traumatic” versus neutral stories. The priming index
was the difference between the incremental identiﬁcation rates for
primed minus unprimed objects. Greater scores indicate greater
priming.3.6.2. Emotional evaluations
A parallel evaluative conditioning index was calculated as the
difference between the emotional evaluations for the primed
minus the unprimed objects. Negative scores indicate greater
conditioned emotional evaluations.
3.6.3. Object recognition task
Data analysis followed signal detection theory (SDT) (MacMillan
& Creelman, 1991). From the hits (correct recognition of original
objects) and false alarms (erroneous recognition of parallel
objects), sensitivity (d’) and response bias (c) scores were calcu-
lated, for both preceding and central objects. Sensitivity is a stan-
dard measure of recognition memory performance that measures
how well participants discriminated between objects from the
stories and parallel objects that they had not seen before, calculated
as d’¼ probit (hits) probit (false alarms). Response bias is
a measure of leniency in endorsing an object as “old”, calculated as
c¼0.5*(probit (hits)þ probit (false alarms)).
3.6.4. Statistical analysis
Data were analyzed with the General Linear Models (GLM)
and CROSSTABS procedures in SPSS 15.0. Planned contrasts were
used to test the hypotheses. GreenhouseeGeisser corrections were
used if appropriate. We report one-tailed signiﬁcance levels for
planned contrasts as the hypotheses were uni-directional, and two-
tailed signiﬁcance levels for other comparisons. Details of the
analyses are found below.
4. Results
4.1. Perceptual priming task
In no case did participants falsely identify an object from the
picture stories when another object was presented.
4.1.1. Did priming occur?
To test whether watching the picture stories led to perceptual
priming, incremental identiﬁcation rates for the objects from
picture stories (primed objects) were compared with those of
matched distracter items that participants had not seen before
(unprimed objects). Primed objects from picture stories were
identiﬁed with greater probability than unprimed objects without
prior exposure. M¼ 0.02, SD¼ 0.14 versus M¼0.03, SD¼ 0.18, F
(1,121)¼ 11.88, p< 0.001, h2¼ 0.089.
4.1.2. Hypothesis 1 (Enhanced perceptual priming)
The results for the perceptual priming task (priming index) are
presented in Fig 1. A repeated measures ANOVA showed a signiﬁ-
cant main effect of story context (traumatic versus neutral),
F(1,121)¼ 9.29, p¼ 0.003, h2¼ 0.071. Consistent with the enhanced
priming hypothesis, blurred pictures of neutral objects that had
preceded the “traumatic” pictures in the picture stories were more
readily identiﬁed, M¼ 0.12, SD¼ 0.19, than those that preceded
neutral pictures, M¼ 0.05, SD¼ 0.19.
4.1.3. Hypothesis 2 (Effects of elaboration on enhanced priming)
The planned contrast comparing the enhanced priming effect
(difference between the priming indices for “traumatic” and
neutral stories) for the autobiographical memory elaboration group
with the other two groups was signiﬁcant, F (1,119)¼ 3.03,
p¼ 0.042, h2¼ 0.025. Enhanced priming for objects from “trau-
matic” stories was evident in both the control, F(1,40)¼ 5.15,
p¼ 0.029, h2¼ 0.114, and the imaginal exposure conditions,
F(1,40)¼ 6.93, p¼ 0.012, h2¼ 0.148, whereas the autobiographical
memory elaboration group showed equal priming for objects from
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seen in the context of traumatic or neutral picture stories. Positive numbers reﬂect
a more positive evaluation. The groups received different post-exposure interventions
(control task without memory processing, imaginal exposure, autobiographical
memory elaboration).
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Fig. 1. Group differences in the priming index (enhancement of identiﬁcation proba-
bility in percent) for neutral objects previously seen in the context of traumatic or
neutral picture stories. The groups received different post-exposure interventions
(control task without memory processing, imaginal exposure, autobiographical
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h2¼ 0.003.
4.1.4. Hypothesis 3 (evaluative conditioning effect)
The results of the emotional evaluations of the objects from the
picture stories are presented in Fig. 2. A repeated measures ANOVA
showed a signiﬁcant effect of story context (traumatic versus
neutral), F(1,121)¼ 8.44, p¼ 0.004, h2¼ 0.065. As expected, neutral
objects that had preceded “traumatic” pictures were evaluated
more negatively, M¼3.30, SD¼ 7.00, than those that preceded
neutral pictures, M¼1.18, SD¼ 6.58.
4.1.5. Hypothesis 4 (Intervention effects on evaluative conditioning)
The planned contrast comparing the conditioned evaluation
effect (difference between emotional evaluations of objects from
“traumatic” and neutral stories) for the two intervention groups
and the control group was signiﬁcant, F (1,119)¼ 3.21, p¼ 0.038,
h2¼ 0.026. Participants in the control group showed the evaluative
conditioning effect and gave more negative emotional evaluations
for objects from traumatic stories, F(1,40)¼ 13.85, p¼ 0.001,
h2¼ 0.257. This was not the case for the two intervention groups,
imaginal exposure, F(1,40)¼ 0.30, p¼ 0.587, h2¼ 0.007; autobio-
graphical memory elaboration group, F(1,39)¼ 1.39, p¼ 0.245,
h2¼ 0.034.
4.2. Intrusion interviews
The planned contrast testing Hypothesis 5 (intervention effect
on unwanted memories) showed the expected difference between
the intervention groups and the control group in the frequency of
intrusive memories at 4 weeks, F (1,118)¼ 3.46, p¼ 0.032,
h2¼ 0.029. The imaginal exposure, M¼ 0.46, SD¼ 0.87, and auto-
biographical memory elaboration groups, M¼ 0.56, SD¼ 1.27,
reported fewer unwanted memories than the control group,
M¼ 1.02, SD¼ 1.93. At 3 months, very few participants reported
unwanted memories, but the intervention groups were still less
likely to report unwantedmemories, 14.3% of the control group and
5.2% of the intervention groups, c2 (1, n¼ 112)¼ 2.69, p¼ 0.05.
4.3. Further analyses
4.3.1. Recognition memory
The results of the object recognition task are presented in Table 1.
Sensitivity and response bias were analyzed using 3 2 2 GLMs,with experimental group as the between subject factor and story
context (“traumatic” versus neutral) and object importance (central
versus preceding) as within-subject factors. There was no main
effect, p> 0.41, nor interactions, all p> 0.14, with experimental
group. As to be expected on the basis of eye-witness research
(Christianson, 1992), there was a main effect of object importance;
central objects were better discriminated than preceding objects, F
(1, 119)¼ 176.63, p< 0.001, h2¼ 0.600. In contrast to the perceptual
priming task, there was no main effect of story context (“traumatic”
versus neutral) in the sensitivity with which the objects were
identiﬁed in the recognition task, F(1, 119)¼ 0.91, p¼ 0.341,
h2¼ 0.008, There was an interaction between story context and
object importance, F (1, 119)¼ 6.48, p¼ 0.012, h2¼ 0.052. Post-hoc
analyses showed that this interaction was due to somewhat better
discrimination of central objects from neutral compared to central
objects from “traumatic” stories, F (1, 121)¼ 4.21, p¼ 0.042,
h2¼ 0.034. There was no difference in the sensitivity of discrimi-
nating preceding objects from traumatic and neutral stories,
p> 0.18.
Table 1 also presents the results of response bias analyses. There
was no main effect, p> 0.69, nor interactions, all p> 0.16, with
experimental group. There was a main effect of story context, F (1,
119)¼ 9.01, p¼ 0.003, h2¼ 0.071, which was qualiﬁed by a trend for
an interaction between story context and object importance, F (1,
119)¼ 2.81, p¼ 0.096, h2¼ 0.023. Further analyses showed that
participants used a more liberal response criterion for central
objects from “traumatic” stories than for central objects from
neutral stories, F (1, 119)¼ 8.04, p¼ 0.005, h2¼ 0.063. However,
there was no effect of story context for the preceding objects, F (1,
119)¼ 1.94, p¼ 0.167, h2¼ 0.016.
Sensitivity and response bias for preceding objects from
“traumatic” stories in the recognition task did not correlate with
identiﬁcation rates in the perceptual priming test, r¼ 0.10,
p¼ 0.289, and, r¼ 0.08, p¼ 0.387, respectively.
4.3.2. Mood ratings
A 3 4 GLM with experimental group as the between subject
factor and experimental phase (before picture stories, after neutral
stories, after trauma stories, after experimentalmanipulation) as the
within-subject factor showed signiﬁcant effects of experimental
phase, F (3, 354)¼ 34.13, p< 0.001, h2¼ 0.225, and a group phase
interaction F (3, 354)¼ 3.66, p< 0.003, h2¼ 0.058. Separate group
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group difference in negative mood after the experimental manipu-
lation, F (1, 118)¼ 4.77, p¼ 0.010, h2¼ 0.075, but not for any of the
other timepoints, allps> .23. The imaginal exposuregroup reported
more negative mood after the experimental manipulation than the
control group, p¼ 0.003. The memory elaboration group did not
differ signiﬁcantly from the other two groups.
5. Discussion
This study was motivated by two clinical observations. First,
intrusive trauma memories often appear to be triggered by cues
that are perceptually similar to the intrusions, or to stimuli that
immediately preceded the respective sensation during the trauma
(e.g., Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Ehlers et al., 2002, 2004). Second, a range
of therapeutic interventions including imaginal reliving (Foa &
Rothbaum, 1998) and cognitive interventions designed to increase
the elaboration of the traumatic experience and link it with its
context of other autobiographical information (Ehlers & Clark,
2000) are effective in reducing such unwanted memories. The
study explored whether priming for stimuli that occur in the
context of trauma and conditioned emotional evaluations may play
a role in these therapeutic effects.
The two memory mechanism under investigation showed the
expected pattern of differences between objects that were
perceived in the context of trauma and those that occurred in
neutral contexts. In line with Hypothesis 1 (enhanced priming
effect), the study replicated previous results (Arntz et al., 2005;
Ehlers et al., 2006; Michael & Ehlers, 2007) that neutral objects
that occur in a “traumatic” context are more strongly primed than
comparable stimuli that occur in a neutral context. The results
complement those demonstrating that people with PTSD show
stronger priming for trauma-related sentences or words than
trauma survivorswithout PTSD (Amir et al., 1996;Michael, Ehlers, &
Halligan, 2005). Enhanced priming was experimentally induced by
embedding neutral objects in a context of either “traumatic” or
neutral picture stories. When presented without this context, the
degree of priming for the objects from these scenes did not differ
(Michael & Ehlers, 2007). Thus, the differences in priming can be
attributed to the different emotional context in which the objects
occurred. Perceptual priming may be more inﬂuenced by stimulus
context and possibly interacts more closely with conditioning
processes than previously thought (e.g., Squire, 2004). Overall, the
results appear to be consistent with theories that emphasize the
role of associative learning in perceptual learning (e.g., McLaren &
Mackintosh, 2000).
There has been a debate in the literature on the inﬂuence of
explicit memory on the performance in implicit memory tasks such
as priming tests (e.g., Jacoby, Toth, & Yonelinas, 1993; Tulving,
Schacter, & Stark, 1982). The present study was not designed to
address this issue so we cannot conclude with certainty that a pure
implicit memory effect was observed. However, the pattern of
ﬁndings in the recognition test makes it very unlikely that the
enhanced priming effect for objects from the “traumatic” stories
stemmed from the intentional search for these objects and the use
of explicit knowledge. On the basis of eye-witness research (e.g.,
Christianson,1992), onemay have expected enhanced sensitivity in
the recognition test for central objects from “traumatic” stories
compared to central objects from neutral stories. This was not the
case in this experiment, possibly due to ceiling effects as all
participants showed very good sensitivity in recognizing central
objects. Importantly, there was no indication of an enhanced
sensitivity in recognizing preceding objects from traumatic stories.
Furthermore, previous research would suggest that if emotional
context has an effect on preceding stimuli, it would be in thedirection of poorer rather than better recall (Christianson, 1992).
Thus, it is extremely unlikely that the enhanced priming effect for
these stimuli can be explained by enhanced explicit memory.
In line with Hypothesis 3 (evaluative conditioning effect),
participants reported that they liked neutral objects that had
preceded the “traumatic” pictures less than those that had
preceded neutral pictures. These results are in line with the general
literature on evaluative conditioning (Hofmann et al., 2010). They
further show that evaluative conditioning can take place evenwith
a single pairing of the conditioned stimulus (preceding object) and
unconditioned stimulus (“traumatic” picture).
The experimental interventions used for the study were
modeled on treatment procedures used in effective treatments of
PTSD. As expected (Hypothesis 5, intervention effect on unwanted
memories), both interventions decreased the likelihood of subse-
quent intrusive memories. This result is in line with the effects of
imaginal exposure (Foa, Zoellner, & Feeny, 2006) and cognitive
therapy as early interventions for PTSD (Ehlers et al., 2003). They
suggest that such very early post-trauma interventions may have
a role in preventing unwanted memories of the trauma and,
possibly, PTSD. The interventions studied here complement other
research on the possible prevention of reexperiencing symptoms.
While some clinically-derived post-trauma interventions such as
psychological debrieﬁng have not shown promising results (e.g.,
Rose, Bisson, & Wessely, 2003), interventions that are based on
cognitive science may show greater promise (e.g., Holmes, James,
Coode-Bate, & Deeprose, 2009; Kindt, Soeter, & Vervliet, 2009).
The effects of the interventions on the two memory mecha-
nisms under investigation differed, as expected. In line with
Hypothesis 2 (effects of elaboration on enhanced priming), a post-
“trauma” intervention designed to increase the elaboration of the
picture stories in the context of the participants’ other autobio-
graphical experiences eliminated the enhanced priming effect. This
result replicates Michael and Ehlers’s (2007) ﬁndings. The present
study extended the previous results in two respects. First, the study
showed that imaginal exposure does not eliminate the enhanced
priming effect and thus operates via other mechanisms. Second, the
study clariﬁed that memory elaboration appears to operate by
enhancing priming for neutral stimuli stimuli rather than by
decreasing priming for stimuli from the traumatic context. This
ﬁnding may have therapeutic implications as it highlights the need
to increase awareness of signs that the world is has gone back to
normal and is reasonably safe after traumatic experiences. This may
be promoted in several ways, for example, stimulus discrimination
training to promote awareness that the current environment is
different to the trauma, or reclaiming your life assignments to
promote access of memories of the non-traumatized self before the
trauma (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Ehlers et al., 2004).
In line with Hypothesis 4 (intervention effects on evaluative
conditioning), both interventions affected emotional evaluations of
the stimulus material from the picture stories. In contrast to the
control group who reported to dislike the stimuli from the “trau-
matic” picture stories more than those from the neutral stories, and
thus showed the expected conditioned evaluation effect, partici-
pants who had received the interventions gave similar ratings
regardless of the context in which they had experienced the
objects. This demonstrates that conditioned evaluations can be
modiﬁed in several ways. The lack of differential ratings to objects
from the trauma stories may reduce the probability that negative
mood is triggered by similar cues in the environment, which may
then trigger trauma memories. It is of interest to note that the
intervention groups did not give neutral ratings. Rather, they
reported that they disliked objects from both sets of stories. The
ﬁndings parallel research into learned fear responses showing that
learned associations are not erased by subsequent extinction
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perceptual priming and evaluative conditioning suggest that
participants’ responses to the objects from the “traumatic” stories
were relatively unaffected by the interventions. Rather, the inter-
ventions facilitated similar responses to the objects from neutral
stories. Thus, both interventionsmay prevent selective responses to
trauma reminders in the natural environment.
The interventions used in this experiment delivered compo-
nents of complex treatment protocols without the context of
a therapeutic relationship to study their pure effects. The pattern of
results may be therefore be different for the full treatment
programs. For example, the imaginal exposure condition used in
this study did not affect priming. This procedure used the visuali-
zation component of the Prolonged Exposure treatment protocol
(Foa & Rothbaum, 1998) and participants did not give a running
commentary about what they were visualizing and did not discuss
their experience afterwards. It is possible that an effect on priming
would have been observed if participants had verbalized their
experience. This would be in line with theories that emphasize the
role of creating a trauma narrative in PTSD (Brewin et al., 1996; Foa
& Riggs, 1993). Similarly, the memory elaboration condition did not
includemethods to facilitate access to themost traumatic moments
and their meanings that are used in Cognitive Therapy for PTSD
(Ehlers et al., 2003, 2005), nor other techniques to change prob-
lematic meanings such as socratic questioning or behavioral
experiments. Including these techniques may have enhanced the
effects of the intervention.
It is noteworthy the term memory elaboration as used in this
study differs from the way it is interpreted by Rubin, Berntsen, and
Bohni (2008). This study followed Ehlers and Clark’s (2000) and
Ehlers et al. (2004)’s hypothesis that a predominance of data-
driven (as opposed to conceptual) and a lack of self-referential
processing during the trauma leads to a relatively poor elaboration
of trauma memories, in particular, a failure to link the worst
moments of traumatic experience with other relevant information
in autobiographical memory. This is thought to prevent these
moments from being updated with other relevant (usually subse-
quent) information that corrects predictions made at the time such
as “I did not die,” “I saw my children again.” Rubin et al. (2008) on
the other hand suggested an enhanced elaboration of the trauma in
that it is thought to become a central component of identity and
reference point for other autobiographical experiences. These
hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. Several studies showed that
both memory disorganization and appraisals of being permanently
changed by the trauma predict PTSD (e.g., Dunmore, Clark, & Ehlers,
2001; Ehlers, Maercker, & Boos, 2000; Halligan, Michael, Clark,
& Ehlers, 2003). The permanent change concept is very similar to
Rubin et al.’s (2008) centrality of event concept.
The study had several limitations. First, the experiments used an
analogue design and it remains unclear to what extent the results
would generalize to traumatic events that would meet DSM-IV
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994) criteria. Ethical consider-
ations limit the induction of trauma in the laboratory. Similarly, it
remains uncertain to what extent the unwanted memories that
participants reported in this study are comparable to those in PTSD,
although it is known that witnessing horriﬁc events can be sufﬁ-
ciently traumatic to induce PTSD (American Psychiatric Association,
1994). Second, the study only assessed two memory processes and
other processes are likely to play a role in reexperiencing symp-
toms, e.g. Pavlovian conditioning of physiological responses (e.g.,
Foa et al., 1989). Third, there was considerable interindividual
variability and the effect sizes for the effects of the intervention
were small. In particular, the proportion of participants who
experienced intrusive memories of the picture stories was low. This
reduced the power of the analyses and possibly the effect sizes. It ispossible that clearer group differences would have emerged if
intrusions had been assessed somewhat earlier, for example, at 2
weeks after the experiment. Fourth, the stimulus material had
some limitations. The results are based on a relatively small
number of objects. In order to make the material as realistic as
possible, the paradigm used ﬁlm clips that show themain character
from the story throughout the picture story. This made it impos-
sible to counterbalance the objects across the neutral and “trau-
matic” picture stories. Although the objects were carefully matched
for ease of identiﬁcation, salience and memorability and Michael
and Ehlers’ (2007) data consistently showed that the objects
were comparable in these respects, we cannot completely rule out
that subtle material effects inﬂuenced the results. It is therefore
reassuring that a recent study (Sündermann, Hauschildt, & Ehlers,
in preparation) replicated the enhanced priming effect when
objects were counterbalanced across neutral and trauma stories.Acknowledgements
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Gesundheit, Mannheim, Germany.Appendix. Contents of the picture stories
Practice story:
1. A man getting drunk
“Traumatic” stories:
1. An execution
2. A woman being raped by a man
3. A man being drowned in a bath tub
4. A dog killing a man
5. A plane crash
6. A woman being strangled by a man
7. A warehouse owner being robbed and tortured
8. A man being stabbed and decapitated
Neutral stories:
1. Teenagers discussing basketball
2. Couple snuggling up in bed together
3. A nun welcoming a couple to a nursing home
4. A cat stealing its owner’s sandwich
5. House move
6. A woman making a telephone call
7. Aman coming home and seeing his wife repairing a boot on the
dining table
8. A worker washing himself at the end of his shiftReferences
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